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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's Motion to Suppress?
II. Whether the trial Court erred in limiting defense counsel's cross-examination?
III. Whether the jury erred in finding Mr. Favazzo guilty of DUI?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

The trial court's factual findings underlying the denial of the motion to suppress is

reviewed for clear error and the conclusions of law for correctness. State v. Riggs. 987
P.2d 1281 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
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II.

The trial court's limitation of defense counsel's cross-examination of a witness is

reviewed for abuse of discretion with reversal required "unless the error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Hackford. 737 P.2D 200, 204 (Utah 1987).
III.

The jury's verdict in a criminal case is reviewed for sufficiency of evidence as a

matter of law to warrant conviction. To affirm the jury's verdict, the court must be sure
the [City] introduced evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime."
State v. Smith , 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The relevant constitutional and statutory provisions are:
United States Constitution, Amendment IV :
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
United States Constitution, Amendment VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
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of Counsel for his defense.
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 12: which states in pertinent part:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him,
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.

Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 14: which states in pertinent part
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated
Salt Lake City Ordinance § 12.24.100: which states in pertinent part:
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this Section for any person to operate
or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this City if the person has a
blood or breath alcohol content of 0.08 grams or greater by weight as shown by a
chemical test given within two (2) hours after the alleged operation or physical
control, or if the person is under the influence of alcohol or any drug, or the
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the person
incapable of safely driving a vehicle within the City. The fact that a person charged
with violating this Section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug
does not constitute a defense against any charge of violating this Section.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 3, 2002, Salt Lake City Police Officer William Bridge stopped the
appellant, David Favazzo based on observed conduct wherein Mr. Favazzo was slumped
over his steering wheel for a period of time and a possible traffic violation. Upon making
contact with Mr. Favazzo, Officer Bridge noted certain physical characteristics including
the odor of alcohol about Mr. Favazzofs person. Officer Bridge then called for a
specialized officer. Officer Roger Nielson a DUI Specialist responded to the scene,
questioned Mr. Favazzo and asked him to perform certain field sobriety tests. Mr.
Favazzo failed the tests and refused Officer Nielson's request to submit to a blood test.
Based on observed physical characteristics, statements by Mr. Favazzo coupled with his
failure of the field sobriety tests and refusal to submit to a blood test, Mr. Favazzo was
arrested for Driving Under the Influence and obstructing traffic.
On May 7,2001, the Honorable William W. Barrett presided over a Motion to
Suppress hearing. At the conclusion of testimony by Officer Bridge, the only witness
who testified, the court denied Mr. Favazzofs motion to suppress. The court then
scheduled the case for a jury trial on August 10, 2001.
On August 10, 2001, a jury convicted Mr. Favazzo of count I, Driving Under the
Influence, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.24.100
and acquitted him of count II, Driving too Slowly. On September 17, 2001, the
Honorable William W. Barrett sentenced Mr. Favazzo. Mr. Favazzo then filed a Notice
of Appeal on October 16,2001, and an Amended Notice of Appeal on October 17,2001.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 03, 2002, at approximately 10:50 p.m., Salt Lake City Police Officer
William Bridge while in his patrol car at the intersection of 500 South and 400 West
heading northbound observed a light blue Nissan automobile stopped at the light in the
southbound lane. The driver appeared to slumped over the steering wheel as if
unconscious, ill or asleep. (R 195). When the light turned green, Officer Bridge
proceeded north. Upon approaching the 400 South 400 West intersection, Officer Bridge
observed that the car had not moved and that a car behind it had to go around. Given the
passage of time, some 10 to 15 seconds, Officer Bridge turned around his patrol car in
order to investigate if there was a problem and determine if there was a reason for the
delay which caused the other car to drive around Mr. Favazzofs car. Mr Favazzofs car
started to move as Officer Bridge approached.
Officer Bridge initiated an investigatory traffic stop assisted by Salt Lake City
Police Officer William Silver. Upon making contact, Officer Bridge noticed the driver,
Mr. Favazzo, the sole occupant of the vehicle had an odor of alcohol about his person.
When Officer Bridge asked Mr. Favazzo to exit the vehicle, he immediately reached for
some money and a lighter that was between his legs. (R 197). Officer Bridge then
handcuffed Mr. Favazzo for officer safety until the arrival of Officer Roger Nielson a
DUI specialist. (R 198).
Upon arrival, Officer Neilson approached Mr. Favazzo and explained that he
would like Mr. Favazzo to perform certain coordination and field sobriety tests in order to
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determine if he was okay to drive. Officer Neilson noted certain physical characteristics
such as a strong odor of alcohol from Mr. Favazzo's breath, unsteady balance, slow
sometimes incoherent speech, red watery eyes, smacking lips and poor short term
memory. In response to amount he had to drink, MR. Favazzo said f,A little, two or so
drinks." When asked "What kind of drugs are you taking?" Mr. Favazzo responded:
"Nothing I am going to tell you about or discuss with you." (R 212 - 215)
Officer Nielson asked Mr. Favazzo perform certain field sobriety tests such as the
horizontal gaze nystagmus, the finger count, the hand slap, finger to nose, and a
preliminary breath test. Mr. Favazzo was asked to perform these particular tests because
he told Officer Nielson that he had nerve damage in his left leg and had broken his back
several times. (R 217) Although Mr. Favazzo agreed to perform a preliminary breath test,
he failed to blow into the instrument as instructed. (R 222-223) Officer Nielson then
asked Mr. Favazzo to submit to a blood test. Mr. Favazzo refused responding that it was
improper and that he would not subject himself to any needles. (R 225) Based on his
refusal and absence of a responsible party, Mr. Favazzo was taken into custody. (R 226)
During the jury trial, the Honorable William W. Barrett somewhat limited defense
counsel's cross examination of Officer Roger Nielson. (R241-243, 246) At the
conclusion of the Appellee's case in chief, Judge Barrett explained his interruption of
defense counsel's cross-examination. (R 262-264). Mr. Favazzo then testified on his own
behalf. The jury deliberated and returned verdict of guilty on the DUI offense and not
guilty on the offense of driving too slowly.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied the defendant's Motion to Suppress based on the
evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing. Under the totality of the
circumstances, the trial court found that the stop of the defendant was reasonable and not
illegal given Officer Bridges'observation and concern.
The right of cross-examination, although a safeguard essential to a fair trial is not
without limitation. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in limiting defense
counsel's cross examination of Officer Roger Nielson, the DUI specialist who responded
to the scene of the incident. The trial court's efforts to encourage effective cross
examination was not an abuse of discretion. The trial court did not limit defense
counsel's ability to pursue certain issues, or infringe on Mr. Favazzo's constitutional right
of confrontation. The effect of the trial court's limitation was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
This court should uphold the decision of the jury in a light most favorable to the
jury verdict. The jury, after hearing testimony from the prosecution and the defense
returned with a verdict of guilty on the count I - DUI and not guilty on Count II- driving
too slowly. Mr. Favazzo, the appellant bears the burden of proving that there was
insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. This Court should affirm the jury's
verdict of guilty as to the DUI charge, unless this Court finds that appellee, Salt Lake City
failed introduce sufficient evidence to support all of the elements of the DUI charge.
ARGUMENT
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I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS
The trial court's findings underlying the denial of Mr. Favazzo's motion to
suppress should be affirmed. At the motion to suppress hearing Officer Bridge testified
that he stopped Mr. Favazzo because he thought Mr. Favazzo who was slumped over his
steering wheel at the intersection, was either impaired, ill or asleep. Officer Bridge
testified that it is not required that a car start moving as soon as the light turns green.
Nonetheless, barring mechanical problems it is expected that a car stopped at an
intersection would move within a fairly reasonable amount of time rather than obstruct
traffic. In the instant case, Officer Bridge testified that there was a vehicle behind Mr.
Favazzo which had to go around in order to continue in its intended direction of travel
southbound.
This court said: [A] traffic stop is a limited seizure and is more like an
investigative detention than a custodial arrest." State v. Parker. 834 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). The reasonableness of the investigative traffic stop at
issue in this case should be governed by the two pronged test set forth in Terry: "(1) Was
the officer's action justified at the inception?, and (2) Was his action reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place?" Id,
(citations omitted).
The answers to both these questions are in the affirmative. The issue is not Mr.
Favazzo's failure to immediately drive once the light turned green. Officer Bridge
observed Mr. Favazzo slumped over his steering wheel. Officer Bridge became

8

concerned when Mr. Favazzo's car did not move for some ten seconds and another car
had to go around him. Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer William Bridge
acted reasonably in stopping Mr. Favazzo tofindout if there was a problem requiring
assistance or attention.
Finally, as stated by this court: "Appellate courts review [a] trial court's factual
findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and the conclusions
of law for correctness." State v. Swing. 11 P.3d 299 (Ut. Ct. App. 2000). The trial court
did not err in denying Mr. Favazzo's motion to suppress.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S LIMITATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CROSS
EXAMINATION OF OFFICER NIELSON WAS HARMLESS. NOT IN
VIOLATION OF MR. FAVAZZO'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
CONFRONTATION.
The trial court's interruption and limitation of defense counsel's cross-examination

of Officer Roger Nielson was an effort to encourage effective cross-examination not an
effort to infringe on Mr. Favazzo's right of confrontation. Appellee agrees that the right
of confrontation serves several important purposes in a criminal trial. However, in the
instant case the trial court's limitation did not infringe on Mr. Favazzo's Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation because Mr. Favazzo through counsel was in fact able to cross
examine Officer Nielson.
The trial court's limitation was an appropriate exercise of its discretion pursuant to
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The record indicates that the trial court
encouraged defense counsel to not waste time by merely going over direct testimony but
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focusing on specific areas of concern. In State v Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 203 (Utah
1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated that the right of cross-examination is not without
limitation. The Court further reasoned: "And as we noted in State v. Chestnut. 621 P.2d
1228 (Utah 1980), the right to cross-examine does not entail the right to harass, annoy, or
humiliate [the] witness on cross-examination, nor to engage in repetitive questioning."
(citations omitted). In the instant case, the rationale behind the trials court's limitation
was to avoid repetitive questioning.
In United States v. Fuentez. 231 F.3d 700, 704 (10th Cir.2000), the Tenth Circuit
said: "The complete denial of access to an area properly subject to cross-examination
infringes on the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, and constitutes reversible error.
On the other hand, merely limiting the scope of cross-examination is a matter well within
the trial judge's discretion and such an error "will not lead to reversal unless an abuse of
discretion, clearly prejudicial to the defendant, is shown." (citations omitted) (see also
United States v. Polk , 550 F.2d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1977) ("A complete denial of
access to an area properly subject to cross-examination constitutes reversible error, but
the extent of cross-examination is discretionary with the trial judge.")).
The instant case does not involve complete denial of access to an area properly
subject to cross-examination. Again, trial court exercised its discretion in an effort to
discourage a mere recitation of the evidence presented on direct. The Supreme Court of
Utah recently reasoned that: "the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for
effective cross-examination, not cross examination that is effective in whatever way, and
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to whatever extent, the defense might wish." State v. Callihan. 484 Utah Adv. Rep. 36,
P31 (Utah 2002) (citations omitted).
Assuming arguendo that this court finds there was some error in the trial court's
action. This court must then determine if the error in limiting or restricting crossexamination was harmless under the constitutional harmless-error standard. In State v
Hackford. 737 P 2d 200, 205, (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court giving some
guidance as to relevant factors to be considered said: "Whether an error under that
standard is harmless depends on a "host of factors," including the importance of the
witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the
presence or absence of evidence collaborating or contradicting the testimony of the
witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and of
course the overall strength of the prosecution's case."
Upon considering the aforementioned factors as well as the trial court's record, this
court should find that the trial court's limitation of defense counsel's cross-examination
was harmless. Although the trial court limited some of defense counsel's crossexamination, defense counsel was not completely denied access to an area proper for
cross-examination.
III.

THE JURY VERDICT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED GIVEN THE
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL

The evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict.
Evidence presented at trial included among other things testimony about Mr. Favazzo's
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consumption of alcohol and possible consumption of drugs, testimony as to impairment
based on Mr. Favazzo's performance of the various field sobriety tests, and Mr. Favazzofs
refusal to submit to a chemical test.
The jury instructions allowed the jury to consider all of the evidence presented
prior to reaching a unanimous verdict. For example, jury instruction number 18 stated:
"If you find that the defendant refused to submit to a chemical test, any inferences which
may arise from such a refusal may be used together with all other evidence introduced at
trial to determine what the facts are." In addition to jury instructions about actual
physical control and the field sobriety tests, jury instruction number 23 stated all of the
essential elements the jury must consider prior to reaching a verdict on the charge of
Driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. In the instant case, the jury's guilty
verdict was based on their finding that the essential elements of DUI had been established
beyond a reasonable doubt.
This court has acknowledged that "On appeal, we recite the facts in the light most
favorable to the juryfs verdict." State v. BurL 839 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah Ct. App. 1992),
cert denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). Additionally, this court said: "We will reverse
only if the evidence is so "'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime." State
v. Harman. 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989).(citations omitted). This court's review
should be "from a perspective most favorable to the verdict the evidence and all
inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence, recognizing that determinations
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regarding witness credibility are solely within the jury's province." Id.
Prior to deliberating and returning a verdict of guilty on the DUI offense, the jury
heard testimony from both Officer Roger Nielsen and Mr. Favazzo. On direct Officer
Nielsen testified that he observed several characteristics consistent with someone who
was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Mr. Favazzo acknowledged having
consumed alcohol and also stated that he was not going to discuss or tell Officer Nielsen
about any drugs he had been taking. The field sobriety tests do not without more
establish an individual's guilt or innocence for he offense of DUI. Office Nielson
testified that he departed from requesting two of the uniform standardized field sobriety
tests, the one-legged stand and the 9-step walk and turn because Mr. Favazzo had some
physical limitation. Mr. Favazzo told Officer Nielson that he had nerve damage in his left
leg and had broken his back several times. As a result Officer Nielson asked Mr. Favazzo
to perform the horizontal gaze nystagmus, the finger count test, a hand slap test, a finger to-nose test and a preliminary breath test. With regard to the HGN, Officer Nielsen
testified that he allowed Mr. Favazzo to stand with his feet a foot and a half apart rather
than with heel and toes together because Mr. Favazzo said that doing so caused him some
pain.
Finally, the trial record indicates that, appellee Salt Lake City presented sufficient
evidence to the jury who as the exclusive judges of the facts, issues of witness credibility
and weight found the defendant guilty of driving under the influence.
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CONCLUSION
Given the underlying facts and circumstance resulting in Officer Bridge's stopping
Mr. Favazzo, the trial court did not err in denying Mr. Favazzofs motion to suppress.
With regard to limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of DUI specialist
Officer Roger Nielson during the jury trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Moreover, the trial court's limitation was not an infringement of Mr. Favazzo's
constitutional right of confrontation as the trial court allowed Mr. Favazzo's counsel to
cross-examine Officer Nielson on subject areas open and proper for cross-examination.
Finally, the jury did not render its verdict in a vacuum. The jury returned with a
verdict after hearing all the evidence and being properly instructed as to the essential
elements that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, the jury's verdict
should be affirmed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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fney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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